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Criminal Procedure: Morgan v. Illinois Takes a Step

Toward Eliminating Hanging Juries in Capital Cases
L Introduction
Whatever else might be said of capitalpunishment, it is at least clear
that its imposition by a hanging jury cannot be squared with the
Constitution.
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart1
Notwithstanding Justice Stewart's declaration, capital murder defendants could not
require trial court judges to ask prospective jurors whether they would automatically
impose the death penalty if the defendant were found guilty until Morgan v.

Illinois,2 which held that capital murder defendants could exclude for cause jurors
who would impose the death penalty regardless of any mitigating circumstances

Capital murder defendants could not require the questioning prior to Morgan despite
the fact that a juror who would automatically impose the death penalty would not

4
be basing his or her verdict upon evidence introduced at the sentencing trial.
5
In all thirty-seven U.S. jurisdictions which presently impose the death penalty,
jurors must consider aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances at the
6
sentencing trial before the death penalty can even be contemplated. Therefore, a

1. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 (1968).
2. 112 S.Ct. 2222 (1992).
3. Id. at 2229-30.
4. The requirement that a jury's verdict "must be based upon the evidence developed at trial" has
been held to go to the "fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial
by jury." Turner v. State, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965).
5. Those jurisdictions presently imposing the death penalty are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, the federal government, and the U.S. military.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Death Row, U.S.A. (Spring 1992) (on file with the Ok/ahoma
Law Review).
6. This is true even in "non-weighing" states (states which do not statutorily require the sentencing
jury to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances and only impose the death
penalty if the aggravators outweigh the mitigation). Texas is one such "non-weighing" state; in upholding
its sentencing scheme, the Supreme Court stated:
[J]urors in Texas must determine whether the evidence presented by the State convinces
them beyond reasonable doubt that each of the three questions put to them must be
answered in the affirmative. In doing so, they must consider both aggravating and
mitigatingcircumstances ....In essence, Texas juries must be allowed to consider "on
the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be imposed, but
also why it should not be imposed."
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 46 (emphasis added) (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)).
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juror who will impose only the death sentence once the defendant is found guilty
is not an impartial juror capable of considering mitigating circumstances.
Disregarding mitigating circumstances is a violation of a sentencing juror's duty
because capital sentencers are required to consider all mitigating evidence.7
Furthermore, it is arguable that a jury from which all jurors who oppose the death
penalty have been excluded but from which no jurors who are automatically in
favor of death have been excluded constitutes a "tribunal organized to return a
verdict of death" which is biased in favor of the State.8
Therefore, excluding jurors who would never impose the death penalty as well
as excluding jurors who would automaaticallyimpose the death penalty is essential
to ensure an impartial jury. The Supreme Court allowed exclusion of jurors who
would never impose the death penalty in Witherspoon v. Illinois' and Wainwright
v. Witt."0 Morgan resolved the issue surrounding jurors who would always impose
the death penalty, and finally supplied the logical corollary to Witherspoon and Witt.
Moreover, Morgan constituted the first real step toward eliminating hanging juries
those tribunals which have been organized to return only a verdict of death.
Part II of this note begins by summarizing the law prior to Morgan. In part I,
Morgan's majority opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent are summarized. Part IV of
the note analyzes the impact of Morgan on the fairness of capital murder trials. The
note concludes in part V that Morgan helps to ensure fairness in the capital
sentencing process and represents a logical extension of the rules of Witherspoon
and Witt.
II. Law Preceding Morgan
A. The Concept of Impartiality
Before the Sixth Amendment" was even made applicable to the states by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment,"2 the Supreme Court held that when a state accorded
a defendant a jury trial, the Fourteenth Amendment required the jury to be compiled

7. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)
(holding that full consideration of mitigation enhances reliability of the sentencing decision, therefore
capital sentencers must be allowed to consider and give full effect to mitigating evidence); Hitchcock v.
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (stating that sentencer cannot be precluded from hearing or cannot refuse
to consider any relevant mitgating evidence); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding that
mitigating evidence cannot be excluded from the sentencer's consideration); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.

586 (1978) (explaining that sentencer may not be precluded from considering relevant mitigating
evidence).
8. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968).

9. Id.
at 510.
10. 469 U.S. 412 (198;).
11. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartialjury .
U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(emphasis added).

12. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice White, decided that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was fundamental and, therefore,
applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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of a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors. 3 The Sixth Amendment specifically
provides for trial by an impartial jury by its terms. 4 Because there is no right to
a jury during the sentencing hearing of a capital trial, 5 these cases provided
precedent for the determination that when the state did provide for juries at
sentencing, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required impartial
sentencing juries to the same extent that the Sixth Amendment required impartial
juries at the guilt phase. 6
Voir dire, the process of asking prospective jurors questions in order to determine
their fitness to serve, is perhaps the only way to determine whether or not they are
impartial. Yet, as a general rule, the Supreme Court has held that questioning jurors
over matters in which they might foster some prejudice is not always mandated by
the Constitution. 7 The result is that if the questioning is refused by the trial judge,
it will not be held reversible constitutional error on appeal." The reasoning behind
this result is that "the determination of impartiality, in which demeanor plays such
an important part, is particularly within the province of the trial judge."'9
Before Morgan there was one limited exception to the general rule of not
constitutionally requiring questioning. There was one type of questioning which had
been held constitutionally required during voir dire to ensure an impartial jury,
prohibiting a trial judge from using his discretion to refuse the questioning. Turner
v. Murra/"' held that due to the "qualitative difference" between death and all other
punishments, questioning during voir dire which sought to elicit racial prejudice was
constitutionally required." The only distinguishing factor between Turner and
Ristaino v. Ross, an earlier case which held inquiry into racial prejudice was not
required, was that Turner was a capital case. ' The result was different in the
capital context because the concept of impartiality in capital cases requires capital
sentencers to consider mitigating circumstances.24 Turnerstands for the proposition
that racial prejudice may infect this important task at sentencing, and therefore
questioning to elicit the bias is required in order for an impartial jury to be
empaneled.'

13. See Turner v. State, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
14. "In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartialjury...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
15. See Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2235; Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990); Clemons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1990); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385 (1986); Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984).
16. See Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2236 (dissent); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)
(plurality).

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1976).
Id.
Id. (quoting Rideau v. State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963)).
476 U.S. 28 (1986).
Id. at 35 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)).
424 U.S. 589 (1976).
Turner,476 U.S. at 33.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Turner,476 U.S. at 35.
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Mu'Min v. Virginia ' dealt with voir dire questions about the effect of pretrial

publicity" on juror impartiality. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that
failure to allow questioning over what specific publicity the jurors had been exposed
to was reversible error, as long as general questions on the subject were asked."

The standard established was that the requested questioning must be more than
merely helpful.

In order to be constitutionally compelled (required by the

constitution with failure to ask resulting in reversible error), the defendant's trial
must be rendered fundamentally unfair by the trial court's failure to ask these

questions.' Only if this standard was met would the concept of impartiality require
requested questioning."'
B. Excluding ImpartialJurors
1. Death QualificationCases

In order to obtain an impartial jury, it is elementary that both parties must
exclude those members of the jury who are not impartial. Prejudiced jurors may be
stricken for cause, and there is no limit to the number of "for cause" challenges one
can utilize.3 By contrast, a juror who is impartial may not be stricken for cause. 2
This is important in capital cases because jurors who may be opposed to the death
penalty may nevertheless be able to put their personal convictions aside and follow
the law. 3 Exclusion of these jurors for cause on the ground that they would be
partial toward the defendant would be improper, and result in a jury that is instead

partial toward the State.' The Supreme Court has addressed the exclusion of jurors
who have been "death qualified," or asked about their abilities to impose the death

penalty.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois," the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the

constitutionality of an Illinois statute allowing the exclusion for cause of venire

members ' who "might hesitate" to return a death sentence." In Witherspoon,

26. 111 S. CL 1899 (1991).
27. Pretrial publicity may so taint a jury pool and preclude impartiality that the defendant will be
Constitutionally entitled to a change of venue. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
28. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908.
29. Id. at 1905.
30. Id.
31. For an academic discussion of the entire jury selection process, see JAMES A. INCIARDI,
CRIMINAL JusiCE 444-50 & n.34 (3d ed. 1990); see also Patrick W. Peters, Capital Voir Dire: A
Procedure Gone Awry, 58 UMKC L. Rv. 603, 608-10 (1990) (discussing general voir dire procedure
in Missouri, which is similar to Oklahoma's statutory procedure).
32. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1985).
33. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 515 nn.7, 9 (1968).
34. "In its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the State produced a jury
uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die [which is the State's position in capital cases]." Id. at
520-21.
35. 391 U.S. 510 (196'3).
36. Venire members, also called prospective jurors, are members of the general public who have
been summoned for jury service and make up the pool of persons from whom the State and the defense
ultimately select the jury that hears the case (termed the petit jury). For an explanation of the entire jury
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nearly half the prospective jurors had been eliminated under authority of the statute;
those who ultimately sentenced the petitioner to die were chosen from the pool of
jurors who remained."8
The Court held that a capital defendant's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to an impartial jury prohibited the exclusion of prospective jurors
simply because they voiced "general objections to the death penalty or expressed
conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction."39 According to
Witherspoon, the exclusion of prospective jurors must be limited to those jurors who
made it "unmistakably clear" that (1) they were irrevocably committed to
automaticallyvote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence; or (2) their
attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial
decision as to the defendant's guilt."'
Later decisions clarified that Witherspoon was not a ground for excluding
4
potential jurors; rather, it was a limitation on the State's power to exclude. ' Hence,
the State could not use Witherspoon to require the exclusion of jurors who were
against the death penalty; instead, if the State were allowed by the trial court to
exclude jurors based on their feelings against the death penalty, Witherspoon limited
exclusion to those jurors who would never impose the death penalty and prohibited
exclusion of jurors who were against the death penalty but could nevertheless follow
the law and impose it in proper cases.
42
invalidated Texas and
Soon after Witherspoon was decided, Furman v. Georgia
of all other states
penalty
statutes
death
effect,
the
and,
in
Georgia death sentences
in
an arbitrary and
applied
was
being
penalty
death
on the ground that the
43
ban on capital
The
Amendment.
the
Eighth
of
in
violation
capricious manner
death penalty
post-Furman
revised
later
five
years
punishment did not last long, and
statutes passed constitutional challenge in Gregg v. Georgia."
Davis v. Georgia,"s the Supreme Court's first post-Gregg opinion in a capital
case, continued to treat Witherspoon violations as reversible constitutional error.
The Court upheld the excusal of jurors who made it 'unmistakably clear' that they
could not be trusted to 'abide by existing law' and 'to follow conscientiously the
instructions' of the trial judge." 7 This was significant because the prospective
jurors never said they would automatically vote against the death penalty. By

selection process, see INCIARDI, supra note 31, at 444-50.
37. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 513.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 523 n.21.
See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 47-48 (1980).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 239-40.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam).

46. Id. at 123.
47. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978).
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upholding their exclusion, the Court ignored the first prong of Witherspoon and
foreshadowed the change to come.
The Court reexamined the Witherspobn standard in Adams v. Texas. 8 In Adams,
the Court reviewed previous cases which dealt with jury exclusion and stated: "This
line of cases establishes the general proposition that a juror may not be challenged
for cause based on hds views about capital punishment unless those views would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath.""9
The Court noted that Witherspoon is not a ground for challenging any prospective
juror. Rather, Witherspoon is a limitation of the State's power to exclude.
Therefore, "if prospective jurors are barred from jury service because of their views
about capital punishment on 'any broader basis' than inability to follow the law or
abide by their oaths, the death sentence cannot be carried out."'
The Supreme Court revisited Witherspoon in Wainwright v. Witt." The Court
expressly adopted the standard for exclusion it had set forth in Adams v. Texas."
Adams dispensed with the reference to "automatic" decision making in the first
prong of Witherspoon.' This resulted in the merging of the two prongs of
Witherspoon in Witt: (1) the state no longer had the high burden to prove with
"unmistakable clarity" that the juror was biased; and (2) there was no longer the
requirement that a juror had to state he would never vote for the death penalty
before exclusion was possible.'
According to Witt, the relevant inquiry now became "whether the juror's views
could 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instruction and his oath."S' The Court's reformulation of the
standard for excluding jurors based on cause was significant: exclusion was no
longer technically limited in the language of the opinion to situations in which
venire persons said they would never consider the death penalty.' This created the
opportunity to argue that jurors who would consider only the death penalty were
also excludable for cause s7
In Lockhart v. McCree,58 the Court considered whether it was error to remove
prospective jurors from the guilt/innocence phase who could not impose the death

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

448 U.S. 38 (198)).
Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
Adams, 448 U.S. at 48 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968)).
469 U.S. 412 (1985).
448 U.S. 38 (198'3); see Witt, 469 U.S. at 424.

53. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424.
54. Id. at 420.
55. Id. (quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45).
56. Recall that in Witherspoon, the standard for exclusion was worded, "[A] sentence of death
cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen
for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious
or religious scruples against its infliction." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968) (emphasis

added).
57. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229.
58. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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penalty at the sentencing phase.59 Social science studies indicated that "death
qualification" produced jurors who were more prone to convict at the
guilt/innocence stage.' The Court assumed that these studies were both methodologically valid and adequate to establish that "death qualification" in fact produces
juries somewhat more "conviction-prone" than "non-death-qualified" juries.6 ' The
Court nonetheless held that the Constitution did not prohibit the states from "death
qualifying" juries in capital cases. 2 Moreover, according to the Court, "death
qualification" does not violate the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement
because the essence of that claim is the systematic exclusion of "a 'distinctive' group
in the community. '
Jurors excluded on Witherspoon and Witt grounds were not a 'distinctive' group
analogous to blacks, women, or Mexican-Americans because they were being
excluded for an attribute within their control.' Relying on Witt, the Court also
rejected the argument that petitioner's right to an impartial jury had been violated
because the absence of "Witherspoon-excludables" slanted the jury in favor of
conviction.' Finally, the Court stated that "an impartial jury consists of nothing
more than 'jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.""
The Court reaffirmed Davis v. Georgia' (the Supreme Court's first post-Gregg
opinion in a capital case) in Gray v. Mississippi.68 In Gray the Court declined the
invitation to overrule Davis and analyze the improper excusal of jurors for cause
under harmless error analysis, reasoning that the Witherspoon-Witt standard is rooted
in the constitutional right to an impartial jury, and the impartiality of the adjudicator
goes to the very integrity of the legal system.' According to the Court, some
constitutional rights, such as an impartial adjudicator, are so basic to a fair trial that
infractions simply are not "harmless error."'7
2. Life Qualification Cases
As early as 1919 there were problems with jurors who would automatically
impose the death penalty. Stroud v. United. States,7' for example, involved the

59. Arkansas' capital murder scheme provided for a guilt/innocence phase and a sentencing phase.
At the guilt phase the jury returned a verdict of guilt or innocence but did not consider punishment. Then
a second "mini-trial" technically called the sentencing phase was held in which evidence of aggravation
and mitigation was presented. The jury decided the proper punishment for the particular defendant at the
sentencing phase. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (Michie 1987).

60. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 172-73.
61. Id. at 173.
62. Id.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 174.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 178 (emphasis in original).
429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam). See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
481 U.S. 648 (1987).
Id. at 668 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
Id. at 668 (citations omitted).
71. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
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stabbing murder of a prison guard by Stroud, an inmate.' The Court denied the
defendant's motion to challenge for cause a prospective juror who favored nothing
less than capital punishment for first degree murder.' The Court agreed that the
challenge should have been granted, but because the defendant was given twentytwo instead of twenty peremptory challenges and exercised one of them to excuse
the objectionable juror, his rights were not abridged by the erroneous ruling as to
the challenge for cause.74 Because no juror who in fact sat upon the trial was
objectionable, the Court affirmed the death sentence.'
In Ross v. Oklahoma,6 perhaps the most important case preceding Morgan, a
juror stated that he would vote to impose the death penalty automatically if the
defendant were found guilty. Defense counsel moved to have the prospective juror
removed for cause, but the trial court refused the request. The defense then used a
peremptory challenge to remove him.
Although the Court ultimately found no error, in dicta the Court stated that if the
prospective juror had actually served and petitioner had preserved his right to
challenge the trial court's failure to remove the venire person for cause (by objecting
and not having anoth, r peremptory available with which to excuse the prospective
juror), then "the sentence would have to be overturned." However, as it stood,
the Court applied a harmless error analysis because "so long as the jury that sits is
impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve
that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated."78 Thus, according
to Ross the defendant's right to a peremptory challenge was not denied or impaired
because he received all that his state's law required"
Ross indicates that jurors who would always impose the death penalty are just as
flawed as jurors who would never impose the death penalty; neither follow the rule
requiring a consideration of mitigation and aggravation before such a decision can
be made. In fact, some dissenting judges in the early cases alluded to this
possibility."0 However, unless provided by individual state law, the defense had no
authority to require this type of voir dire if the trial court refused it. The lower

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 20, 21.
Id.
Id.

76. 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
77. Id. at 85.
78. Id. at 88.
79. Oklahoma required a defendant who disagreed with a trial cour's ruling on a for cause challenge

to preserve the claim by exercising a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. Even then, the error is
grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts his peremptories and an incompetent juror is forced
upon him. Ross, 487 U.S. .t 89. However, the Court did note that no claim was being made that the trial
court repeatedly and deliberately misapplied the law in order to force the appellant to use his
peremptories to correct th- errors, implying such behavior could possibly result in error even if an
incompetent juror did not ultimately sit. Id. at 91 n.5.
80. See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 52 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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courts remained split as to whether or not such questioning was necessary to ensure
an impartial jury."' Thus, Morgan was long overdue.
III. Morgan v. Illinois
A. Factual Background
Derrick Morgan was convicted of first degree murder.' After considering
evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the jury sentenced him to
death.' The evidence at trial indicated that Morgan lured a drug dealer who was
also a friend into an abandoned apartment and shot him six times in the head.' El
Rukns, one of Chicago's violent inner-city gangs, allegedly hired Morgan to kill the
competing drug dealer for $4000.'
During voir dire, seventeen prospective jurors were excused when they expressed
substantial doubts about their ability to follow Illinois law in deciding whether to
impose a sentence of death.' The jurors were excused following "death qualification" questions pursuant to Witherspoon and Witt.' However, the trial court
refused defense counsel's request to ask the prospective jurors if any of them would
automatically vote to impose the death penalty, no matter what the facts, if Morgan
were found guilty.' The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, rejecting the claim
that pursuant to Ross v. Oklahoma,' voir dire must include the "life qualifying" or
"reverse-Witherspoon"question upon request.'
B. The Majority Decision
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court to decide whether
during voir dire for a capital offense a state trial court may, consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, refuse inquiry into whether a
potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction of the
defendant.9' The Supreme Court reversed the Illinois court, holding that Morgan
was entitled, upon his request, to inquiry aimed at discerning those jurors who, even
prior to the State's case-in-chief, had predetermined whether or not the death penalty
should be imposed It was reasoned that such a conviction by jurors reflected
directly on their inability to follow the law.93 Inadequacy of the voir dire created
doubt in the Court's mind as to whether Morgan was sentenced to death by a jury

81. See Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2227 nn.3, 4.
82. Id. at 2226.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
487 U.S. 81 (1988).
Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2227.
Id.
Id. at 2223.
Id.
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empaneled in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment, resulting in reversal of
Morgan's death sentence."
Noted in the opinion was that Witt allows the removal for cause of those jurors
whose views on the death penalty substantially impair their ability to perform their
duties according to their oath and the law; and that it is the adversary seeking
exclusion who must demonstrate through questioning that the potential juror lacks
impartiality. Accordingly, the Court reasoned:
Were voir dire not available to lay bare the foundation of petitioner's
challenge for cause against those prospective jurors who would always
impose death following conviction, his right to not be tried by such
jurors would be rendered as nugatory and meaningless as the State's
right, in the absence of questioning, to strike those who would never do
5
9

SO.

C. The Dissenters
Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined,
filed a spirited dissent. They disagreed with the majority's conclusion for two
reasons.
First, Scalia did not view the issue in the case as involving a juror who would
ignore the requirement of finding an aggravating factor (and thus one who would
not be following the law).' Instead, Scalia perceived the issue as one in which
certain veniremen could never find enough mitigation once aggravation was found
to preclude returning a death sentence.' By viewing the issue in this way, Scalia
believed the requested questioning was not constitutionally necessary to ensure an
impartial jury.
Second, all three dissenting Justices would have agreed with the majority "if it
were true that the instructions required jurors to deem certain evidence to be
'mitigating' and to weigh that evidence in deciding the penalty."" However, they
did not feel the instructions given precluded a juror from taking the view that capital
murder always warranted a death sentence. In Scalia's view, the instructions
indicated that if the jury found at the death-eligibility stage that Morgan committed
a contract killing, that was necessarily an aggravator and then each juror could
determine whether there was any evidence that would be mitigating. Thus,
according to Scalia, Illinois law does not preclude ajuror from taking the bright-line
position that there are no valid reasons why a defendant who has committed a
contract killing should not be sentenced to death, as such a juror does not "fail ...
to consider the evidence." 99

94. Id. at 2235.

95. Id. at 2232 (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 2236.

97. Id.
98. Id. at 2237.

99. lId
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IV. Morgan Analysis
In capital cases where the defendant's very life is in the hands of twelve people,
the idea that the trial will be decided by a "hanging jury" seems preposterous. Yet,
although the Supreme Court considered "death qualification" as early as 1968,"°.
life qualification did not become law until the 1992 Morgan decision. Morgan is
a landmark case which will have far-reaching implications in capital cases.
A. Impartiality Has Come Back to Life
Until Morgan, the Supreme Court had weakened the notion of what constituted
an "impartial" jury.'' For example, as recently as 1991 the Court held it was not
a violation of the right to an impartial jury to refuse requested questioning of
prospective jurors about the content of the pretrial publicity to which they bad been
exposed." z This was despite the acknowledgment that this information "might
have been helpful in assessing whether a juror is impartial."' "w Thus, it appeared
the force of Ross and Mu'Min's predecessors,
which dealt strictly with Sixth
04
Amendment violations, had been eradicated.
Morgan, however, breathed new life into these earlier cases by dealing strictly
with the Sixth Amendment violation it confronted. By refusing to apply the same
kind of harmless error analysis employed in Ross and Mu'Min, °s the Morgan
Court affirmatively renewed the importance of the right to an impartial jury. The
fact that jurors affirmatively answered general impartiality questions could have
been used to apply a harmless error analysis as was done in Mu'Min, which held
that questions over what specific publicity the jury was exposed to were not
constitutionally compelled if the jury had been asked general questions on jury
impartiality. Morgan, however, specifically rejected the argument that general
impartiality questions satisfied the impartiality requirement."° This is a significant
departure which should rekindle the hope that relief once again will be granted on
jury impartiality grounds, and which should likewise dispel the assumption born of
Ross and MuMin that jury impartiality issues will simply be discarded under a
harmless error analysis. This is a correct result, as the Sixth Amendment right to

100. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
101. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (explaining that it is harmless error to refuse
specific questions even if helpful in determining impaitiality, as long as general questions asked); Ross
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 145 (1968) (stating that harmless error occurs if court denies for cause challenge
of impartial juror when defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to remove the juror).
102. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908.
103. Id.at 1905.
104. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Turner v. State, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See discussion supra part II.A.
105. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988); Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. 1899 (1991) (discussed
supra note 101).
106. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1905.
107. Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2232.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 46:729

an impartial jury is fundamental,"~ and thus should not be treated under a
harmless error analysis."
Morgan is also a groundbreaking decision in that its language supports the
proposition that a capital defendant has the right to any questioning which could
lead to the exclusion for cause of prospective jurors:
We deal here with petitioner's ability to exercise intelligently his
complementary challenge for cause against those biased persons on the
venire who as jurors would unwaveringly impose death after a finding
of guilt. Were voir dire not available to lay bare the foundation of
petitioner's challenge for cause against those prospective jurors who
would always impose the death following conviction, his right not to be
tried by such jurors would be rendered as nugatory and meaningless as
the State's right, in the absence of questioning, to strike those who
would never do so.1
Morgan may undermine Mu'Min. Perhaps now a defendant should be entitled to
know the content of pretrial publicity if she can argue that the content has caused
venire persons to solely consider the death penalty as a punishment. For example,
an article may contain a story about the defendant's past crimes, render an opinion
that the defendant will be a continuing threat to society,1" and conclude that death
is the only punishment appropriate for such a person for society's sake. In such a
case, Morgan arguably requires questioning into the content of the publicity so that
it can be determined which jurors have been affected by the publicity to the extent
that they will only consider the death penalty.
Morgan's language also supports the proposition that capital defendants are
entitled to questioning regarding prospective jurors' ability to consider any
mitigating evidence. The Morgan Court clearly stated: "[A]ny juror to whom
mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that
juror has formed an opinion ' concerning
the merits of the case without basis in the
2
evidence developed at trial."
Given this reasoning, it is evident that Morgan may require specific questioning
on whether jurors will consider certain evidence as mitigating or not. For example,
defense attorneys can cite Morgan as entitling them to ask prospective jurors
whether they can consider specific factors (such as a particular defendant's age or
a bad family background) as mitigating which the defense anticipates putting on at
sentencing stage. Morgan entitles defendants to this line of questioning and to
exclusion for cause of jurors who state they are unable to consider. all or even

108. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
109. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
110. Morgan, 112 S. CL at 2232.
111. Continuing threat is an aggravating circumstance in many death-penalty jurisdictions which
permits imposition of the death penalty once it is found. See, e.g., 21 OLA. STAT. § 701.12(7) (1991).
112. Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2235.
113. Note that the inquiry is to whether they will consider the mitigating evidence, not to whether
they will give it any weight. Of course, jurors are allowed to give no weight to mitigating evidence once
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some of the anticipated mitigating evidence. This is a good result, especially in the
context of the death penalty where the punishment is the most severe provided by
law, and irreversible once imposed. In such a serious case, it is imperative that
defense attorneys be given ample opportunity to elicit any prejudice of prospective
jurors.
Morgan also may require the identification and exclusion of persons with strong
pro-death penalty views even when they would not automaticallyimpose the death
penalty. When the Supreme Court eliminated the "automatically" language in
Witherspoon in favor of the Witt standard of substantial impairment of the ability
to follow the law,' the State was allowed the right to exclude a larger group of
anti-death penalty persons. Therefore, by analogy the defense should be allowed
to exclude a larger group of pro-death penalty persons than those who state they
would automatically impose the death penalty. Those jurors whose pro-death
penalty views are so strong that their ability to fulfill their duty would be
substantially impaired should be excludable under Morgan. This ensures fairness
and unanimity between the state and the defense.
B. Juror's Own Views on Their Impartiality
One 1987 study found that twenty-six out of thirty-two persons who would
automatically impose the death penalty also stated they "would not be substantially
impaired or prevented from performing their juror duties despite having also stated
that they would always vote for the death penalty for guilty capital defendants.""' 5
This led the study's authors to conclude that "at least some potential jurors are not
aware that failure to consider all punishment options in the penalty phase of the
trial is a violation of the juror duties.""'
Another study supported this finding, when only sixteen persons said their
attitude toward the death penalty was so strong that it would seriously affect their
abilities to perform their juror duties, but upon further questioning forty-two of
them said that regardless of the evidence they would always give the death penalty
for capital murder." 7
Morgan is significant because it affirmatively recognizes that jurors can honestly
believe they are impartial when in fact they are not."' Furthermore, this reality
was at least partly the basis for Morgan's holding that general questions do not

they have considered it, but they cannot give the evidence no weight by excluding it from their
consideration. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
114. See discussion supra part II.B.1 (death qualification cases).
115. Michael L. Neises & Ronald C. Dillehay, Death Qualificationand ConvictionProneness: Witt
and Witherspoon Compared, 5 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 479, 493 (1987).
116. Id. at 492.
117. See Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 10-11, Morgan (No. 91-5118) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review) (citing
Maria Sandys & Robert C. Dillehay, Juror Qualification Under the New Wainright v. Witt Standard: A
Test of Jurors' Ability To Anticipate Their Role 7 (paper presented at the meetings of the Southeastern
Psychological Ass'n, Apr. 1987)).

118. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2233.
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suffice and specific questions on impartiality are required." 9 This provides capital
defense attorneys with authority to elicit more information upon which the decision
of whom to excuse will be based. The Morgan Court issued a favorable and just

decision which should be utilized by defense attorneys to ensure that while their
client is on trial for his life, he is tried by an impartial adjudicator.
C. Impact on Those Already Sentenced to Death
Morgan's impact is substantial on individuals sentenced to death after having
been refused a request for "life qualification" questioning. Morgan unquestionably
entitles defendants to a new sentencing hearing when they have preserved the error
and are now on direct appeal."

More significantly, Morgan should also provide relief for defendants at the postconviction stage, as it is based upon prior precedent of the Court.' Because it
is based on precedent, it does not announce a "new rule"'" for retroactivity
purposes and thus doe; not foreclose habeas petitioners from raising the failure to
excuse jurors for cau;e who would automatically impose the death penalty as

reversible error at the post-conviction stage."
Morgan's impact on individuals who have already been sentenced to death but
who did not request the "life qualification" questioning at trial may be minimal.
Morgan specifically stated that "on voir dire the court must, on defendant's
request, inquire into tie prospective juror's views on capital punishment ... ."
Therefore, the defendant must "exercise intelligently his complementary challenge

for cause against those biased persons on the venire who as jurors would
unwaveringly impose death after a finding of guilt."'"

The language indicated

that no error can be .claimed by defendants who did not request the "life
qualification" questioning. A finding of error on impartiality grounds is based

partly on the notion that adequate voir dire is an essential part of the defendant's

119. Id.
120. The law has not yet been "frozen" for these individuals; defendants get the benefit of any
changes in the law between the time of trial and the time the Supreme Court denies certiorari (or the time
to petition for certiorari has expired). Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965). Furthermore,
it is argued infra that Morgan does not announce a "new rule" for retroactivity purposes; and assuming,
arguendo, that Morgan does announce a "new rule," defendants on direct appeal still benefit from it.
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
121. It is a logical applization of the law as it has evolved from Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510 (1968) and its progeny, especially Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
122. A "new rule" is defined as one which "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the
States or the Federal Goverment... [tlo put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague v. Lane,
109 S. Ct 1060, 1070 (1989).
123. When a petitioner seeks federal habeas relief based on a principle announced after a final
judgment, it must first be det.ermined whether the decision relied upon created a new rule. If not, relief
may be granted only if it is aso determined that granting the relief sought will not create a new rule by
applying the prior decision in a novel setting which extends the precedent. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct.
1130, 1135 (1992).
124. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2230-31.
125. Id. at 2232.
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right to an impartial jury." Consequently, it appears that a defendant cannot
complain that he was denied adequate voir dire if he failed to request an adequate
voir dire - he must have requested the reverse - Witt questioning and have been
denied, or have been granted the questioning but then have had his for-cause
challenge denied. A defendant would not know whether or not a for-cause
challenge is necessary without questioning the jury. Accordingly, where there is
no requested questioning, there may be no constitutional violation. Under this
analysis, defendants who did not request the questioning most likely waived the
rights set forth in Morgan.
However, relief may still be available to defendants who were sentenced by
juries who were not questioned. The Court did hold that the failure to ask the jury
the reverse-Witt questions resulted in inadequate voir dire." 7 This is true if the
failure to question was because the court refused to allow it or if the failure to
question occurred because defense counsel never requested it since there was no
legal basis to do so. The result is the same: an empaneled jury not in compliance
with the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court analyzed the way Oklahoma conducted its waiver"u rule
in Ake v. Oklahoma." In Ake, the Court decided that Oklahoma's waiver rule
does not apply to fundamental error, and under Oklahoma law, federal constitutional errors are "fundamental.' 3 0 Under Ake it can be argued that the right to "life
qualification" questioning is not waivable because failure to conduct the
questioning results in an inadequate voir dire in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
A Sixth Amendment violation is fundamental constitutional error, as the right to
an impartial jury is a fundamental constitutional right.13 ' Thus, one could argue
that the waiver rule cannot apply to Morgan errors. In addition, it is important to
remember that it has been said that there is a presumption against the waiver of
constitutional rights.
V. Conclusion
Morgan is beneficial to capital trial lawyers and death penalty defendants. States
which did allow the "life qualification" questioning on voir dire prior to Morgan
had nearly as many causal strikes as those resulting from the "death qualification"
questioning, indicating that granting both types of questioning "goes a long way

126. Id. at 2230.
127. Id. at 2235.

128. Certain rights are "waivable" by criminal defendants. A waiver is the intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966). Waiver most
often occurs in situations where defendants fail to object, resulting in a bar from subsequently raising
the error to which there was no objection.
129. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
130. Id. at 74-75.

131. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
132. Brookhart,384 U.S. at 4 (also a Sixth Amendment case) (holding it reversible error to refuse
cross-examination and confrontation of witnesses without valid waiver, which must be an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege).
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toward leveling the playing field."'' After Morgan, all states must, in effect,
"level their playing fields," ensuring fairness for capital defendants.
Morgan provides a tool that, if utilized, will help ensure that the jury ultimately
selected will not be a hanging jury - a "tribunal organized to return a verdict of
death.""l3 Morgan ensures that the decision of whether another human being
should live or die will not be made by persons who are incapable of following the
law. The result should be more fairness in capital cases.
Jaye Mendros

133. Current Cases and Issues, CAPITAL CONCERNS (Ky. Capital Litig. Resource Ctr., Frankfort,
Ky.), July 1992, at 2,6 (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
134. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968).
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